

# FOREIGN POLICY BULLETIN

*An interpretation of current international events  
by the Research Staff of the Foreign Policy Association*



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## **ERP Gives U. S. New Lever In East-West Struggle**

The intensive pre-election campaign in Italy, the bloody uprising in Bogotá, and mounting tension in Berlin highlight the East-West conflict that has rapidly grown in intensity since the Czechoslovak coup. Some observers feel that this conflict has assumed such proportions that war offers the only way out. Others, on the contrary, take the view that the very fact tension has reached a climax will force leaders on both sides to reassess the world situation, and either strike a balance of power through some form of armed truce, or undertake negotiations of a character untried since the war.

In any such reassessment, it is generally agreed that during the past year the U.S.S.R., despite outward appearances, has lost ground, while the United States has registered notable gains. On the surface it has seemed that the Soviet government was increasing its capacity for future bargaining by various political and economic moves in Eastern Europe and the Balkans, including the establishment of the Cominform, Communist seizure of power in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, liquidation of independent Socialist groups in Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary, and extension of credits by Moscow to its neighbors to offset the attraction of the Marshall plan. In actuality, however, the influence of Russia and communism has been markedly waning as the peoples of Europe, weary of war and civil strife, have tried to rebuild their shattered lives and economies. In fact, it was fear that the Communists might register losses at the polls that apparently inspired Premier Gottwald's coup in Czechoslovakia. In

Italy the Communists, finding that their slogans aroused diminishing response among workers and peasants, have sought to win votes through appeals to the nationalist and religious sentiments previously stressed by the Vatican and the Christian Democrats, now in control of the government.

To an increasing extent Moscow has had to rely on the threat of military force and on economic concessions to maintain its influence over neighboring countries, instead of the ideological appeal which once promised success without resort to war. The consensus of informed opinion is that the U.S.S.R., which lost between fifteen and twenty million people in World War II, and is in the throes of reconstructing its war-destroyed economy, does not want war at the present time. Should this judgment prove correct, it is within the realm of possibility—especially if the Italian elections result in a Communist defeat—that the Soviet government may be prepared for a period of relative stabilization and resumption of negotiations with the United States.

### **U.S. Gains Bargaining Power**

Meanwhile, this country has enhanced its bargaining power by three main measures: passage of the European Recovery Program by a large bipartisan majority; the decision to maintain adequate armed forces despite differences of opinion as to the relative advantages of UMT and a large air force; and a growing inclination on the part of a nation which has traditionally opposed "entangling alliances" to work in close co-operation with the na-

tions of Western Europe. These nations, for their part, have agreed to co-operate on two planes—the five-power, fifty-year, Brussels military and political alliance, and the sixteen-nation machinery for joint utilization of American aid under the ERP. The new emphasis in American foreign policy has done more to redress the balance of forces between the United States and Russia, and to stabilize conditions in Europe, than the policy of "containing" Russia which brought retaliation from Moscow without striking at the root of the problems that had fostered communism. In bringing about this change American public opinion has played an important part. In spite of alarmist newspaper headlines, the mood of the country is neither defeatist nor hysterical. The best tonic for the nation today is the opportunity to take positive constructive action in world affairs—an opportunity offered by the ERP and emphasized by its administrator, Paul G. Hoffman.

### **Future Use of Power**

Now that the United States again has bargaining power at its command, the use that will be made of this power becomes of supreme importance. Any indication that the United States, in order to check Russia and communism, will seek or accept the support of groups or individuals regarded as reactionary will damage the cause of the United States abroad—as was evident from the surprise produced by the decision of the House of Representatives, promptly reversed, to include the Franco regime in the ERP. More and more the conviction is gaining

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ground that Communist influence can be combatted most effectively neither by atomic bombs nor by propaganda warfare, but by steady improvement in the economic and social conditions of war-devastated and underdeveloped countries. This view was expressed by Dwight P. Griswold, chief of the American mission

to aid Greece, when he said on April 6 that not the guerrilla forces but grinding poverty and runaway inflation are the chief threats to Greek recovery. There is also a rising tide of sentiment in favor of reorganizing the United Nations in such a way as to strengthen it, with proposals ranging from various reforms of voting

procedure in the Security Council to immediate formation of world government, even if it means exclusion of Russia, as proposed by a group of American atomic scientists at Princeton, New Jersey on April 11.

VERA MICHELES DEAN

*(The first of two articles on changing aspects of American foreign policy.)*

## ***German Unity Key Issue In Berlin Crisis***

With the collapse of quadripartite government in Germany, Russia and the Western powers are engaging in a diplomatic battle in Berlin which makes the former German capital the most critical point in Europe at this moment. This is true partly because Berlin is one of the few places where the cold war is waged by the principals themselves rather than by local pro-Western groups and Communists, as is the case in Italy or Greece. But a more fundamental reason for Berlin's importance is that both sides feel so much is at stake in this crisis they cannot afford to make far-reaching concessions.

### ***Berlin's Symbolic Value***

The prize for which Russia and the Western powers are vying is nothing less than the control of Germany and ultimately, because of the former Reich's economic and strategic importance, of all Europe. Since Berlin is such a significant symbol of German national unity, it is also clearly desired by the Russians as the capital of the Communist-controlled German state now in preparation in the Soviet zone. Berlin would furnish the Russians themselves and the pro-Soviet Germans with an ideal platform from which to address appeals to the Western Germans to join their fellow countrymen in the East in establishing a unified German state. Unity — *Einheit* — which has been the German Communists' chief slogan since the end of the war, would thus be linked with the promised restoration of the traditional capital of Germany.

By the same token, the Western powers feel they cannot abandon their zones in Berlin lest in doing so they strengthen the Soviet-sponsored state at the very moment they are themselves trying to create a state in Western Germany. This state has been in the making since the November session of the Council of Foreign Ministers failed to make any headway toward a German peace settlement, and although still far from complete, its emergence as a new political entity is not far distant.

### ***Russia's Political Weapons***

Since all pretense that Russia and the West agree on the future of Germany has been brushed aside in the course of the current struggle in Berlin, it is more important than ever to evaluate the elements of strength which the rival powers have at their command in the contest for control of Germany. High on the list of Russia's political assets is the well-organized Communist party in Eastern Germany. How effective its propaganda is in crossing the border between the Soviet and Western zones of Germany cannot be determined accurately, but recent Communist-inspired rumors about the imminent departure of American and British troops have been making some Germans, at least, less willing to co-operate with the Western powers.

Among the more tangible sources of Soviet strength is the geographic fact that Russian territory is close to Germany, thus making it relatively easy for the Red Army to reinforce its units in Germany at short notice. Force is by no means, however, the only method Russia has at its command. It may well be of decisive importance that the Soviet Union, alone among the Allies, is in a position to restore at least a portion of Germany's lost provinces which it now controls. The Western powers, which are finding that their efforts to restore Trieste to Italy are enormously popular among the Italians, must consider the effect a comparable Russian move in connection with former German territories in the East might have on the Germans at some future date.

### ***Split in Western Ranks***

Compared with Russia, the Western powers' sources of strength seem less impressive. Not only are the centers of Western military power remote from German territory while the non-Communist forces are disunited, but the three Western powers are conspicuously handicapped by their failure to agree among themselves

on a German policy. For many weeks Washington has regarded as "imminent" France's agreement to merge its zone with Bizonia, but the long-heralded event has been repeatedly postponed. Yet the reason for French hesitancy is not hard to find, provided it is not sought solely in stock remarks about France's fears of a unified German government and German control of the Ruhr. Important as these deep-seated fears are for the French, they are at present overshadowed by concern lest France, by playing an active role in the creation of a Western German state, invite Russian retaliation without having first obtained a firm military guarantee from the United States. Until this country shows a definite intention to provide military underpinning for the new Western European Union, France may be expected to refrain from sponsoring a German state in the West.

Assuming, however, that all of Western Germany is soon united in a new state, what can its sponsors offer that Russia cannot outbid? American economic aid constitutes a partial answer, for countless Germans in the Western zones have been pinning their hopes on the ERP. In addition the Western powers, once they have frankly admitted that they are competing with Russia for the control of Germany, can emphasize more strongly than heretofore the fact that they offer an alternative to the police state Russia has been developing in Eastern Germany. Britain, rather than the United States, is taking the lead in waging this kind of psychological warfare. In the strongest appeal yet made by a Western spokesman, General Robertson, British military governor, urged on April 7, to stand together against those who "with democracy on their lips and a truncheon behind their backs would filch your German freedom from you." Moreover, the British have indicated that socialization of the Ruhr industries is by no means excluded if the Germans want to adopt such a measure.

WINIFRED N. HADSEL

# Party Cleavages Background For Bogota Revolt

In the rioting that erupted in Bogotá on April 9, a few seconds after the assassination of Jorge Eliécer Gaitán, Liberal party chief, the representatives of the American governments meeting in the Colombian capital had an uncomfortably vivid object lesson of the stark realities underlying Latin American politics. Since the 1890's Colombia has had a reputation for political stability unusual among its neighbors. Power had been transferred from the Conservative party to the Liberal party in 1930, and then recaptured by the Conservatives in 1946, without major incident. That this proved possible was perhaps due to the fact that the leaders of the two major political parties, members alike of proud old families of Spanish descent, were not ideologically far apart. Since the 1930's, however, new issues and leaders have emerged, ruffling this political tranquillity, dividing the Liberal party, and widening the distance between Conservatives and Liberals. Such arrangements for compromise at the top as existed between the two parties had degenerated by this spring into a "political truce" expressly set for the duration of the inter-American conference.

## Gaitán—New Voice

The present divisions date at least as far back as the 1946 presidential elections when members of the Liberal party were unable to agree upon a single candidate. The party elders, led by ex-President Eduarde Santos, favored Gabriel Turbay, the industrialist. Syrian-born Turbay, despite his exotic background was more acceptable than Jorge Eliécer Gaitán, the choice of the Socialist faction of the party. This faction called itself *Unir*—unite—and its program was roughly analogous to that of Democratic Action, now in power in Venezuela, and Apra in Peru. Gaitán was a middle-class lawyer, who had studied in Italy, and his enemies claimed that he had learned his ideas and techniques for enlisting popular support from Mussolini. But, writing in Colombia's critical weekly, *Sábado*, on January 24, Juan Lozano y Lozano stated that Gaitán "has put into circulation

among us a new value, the social value of politics, and whether the men of the old parties like it or not, it is with reference to this value that . . . the political "activity of all the republic is informed."

Gaitán rolled up impressive support at the polls in 1946, but his candidacy split the Liberal vote, and the Conservative candidate, Dr. Mariano Ospina Pérez, became President. A year later the Liberal party, now reunited under Gaitán, gained a majority in the Colombian congress. Following a policy initiated by previous administrations, President Ospina announced he would give Colombia a bipartisan government. Factional differences came to a head in January of this year, when pitched battles between Liberals and Conservatives took place in the mining province of Santander del Norte.\* Liberal protests, culminating in a great silent demonstration in Bogotá on February 7, failed to obtain from the government either adequate individual guarantees or satisfactory representation in the provincial governments and the national cabinet. In March the party directorate withdrew its representatives from the cabinet. When President Ospina thereupon appointed Laureano Gómez Minister of Foreign Relations in his new, all-Conservative cabinet, thus ensuring the certainty of Gómez' election as president of the Inter-American conference, Liberal opinion was further inflamed. Gómez is chief of the Conservative party and publisher of *El Siglo*, the party organ, but is not regarded as representing the best elements even in his own party, and what he stands for is the antithesis of the Liberal program.

## What Next in Colombia?

Two days after Gaitán's assassination, martial law was proclaimed, and a new bipartisan cabinet, weighted in favor of the Liberals, was installed. Relative quiet has returned to the Colombian capital, and it is possible to take stock of the causes and consequences of the disorders. The government has placed blame on the

Communist party which, it claimed, took immediate advantage of Gaitán's assassination both to force termination of the Inter-American conference, currently engaged in considering adoption of an anti-Communist resolution, and to embarrass the Colombian government. Some eyewitnesses believed they saw evidence of a systematic plan in the events following immediately after the murder. Secretary Marshall told correspondents on April 12 that the uprising was in the pattern of Communist-provoked disturbances in France and Italy. On the same day the Colombian government announced severance of diplomatic relations with Russia on the ground that foreign agents, some of whom have been caught, had fomented the revolt.

The Gaitán movement, by advocating social reform, had barred the way of the Communists to a larger organization and more effective operation in Colombia. At the same time, the *gaitanistas* themselves were indiscriminately labeled "reds" by the extreme Conservatives, who had advocated hunting down the latter with fire and sword. Nor was Gaitán loved by the political leaders of his own party, who faced a considerable dilemma with respect to the 1952 elections. It is also possible that the Liberal party head was murdered by a personal enemy, and that all the political parties moved in to obtain what advantages they could from the resulting upsurge of popular anger and dismay.

What will happen next in Colombia depends ultimately on whether leaders of the various factions within the major parties can satisfy the popular sentiment for reform that the *gaitanista* movement had unleashed. The followers of Gaitán are not likely to be appeased by the composition of the new cabinet—and may, in fact, consider themselves betrayed. The tragic events of the past week, too, provide food for thought to the American governments now intent on guaranteeing the security of this hemisphere.

OLIVE HOLMES

\*See *Foreign Policy Bulletin*, February 20, 1948.

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## College Conference

The Annual FPA College Conference will be held on April 16 at International House in New York and will be attended by representatives from 40 colleges in southern New England and the metropolitan area of New York. The conference follows a unique program which may be of interest to other community associations as a possible pattern for college conferences.

The subject of the conference is "Misunderstandings in the Non-Russian World." Clarence A. Peters, National Program Director of the FPA, will preside, and Vera Micheles Dean, Research Director of the FPA, will be the keynote speaker. Following her address, 12 roundtables will convene for a two-hour discussion. After lunch Dr. Julian Woodward, Public Opinion Analyst for Elmo Roper, will speak on "How Can We Measure What People are Thinking about International Affairs?" The roundtables will then reconvene for an hour to discuss proposed solutions and recommendations. In conclusion the discussion chairmen will report the findings of their roundtables to the plenary session.

In preparation for the conference, assignments to roundtables on specific subjects to be considered were sent to all participants together with discussion outlines and bibliography. The subjects included: "International Economy," "Postwar Europe," "The Middle East," and "Colonial Areas." The chairmen and secretaries of the roundtables were selected two weeks in advance, and attended a luncheon at which final arrangements were made for the all-day conference.

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## Association Meetings

BUFFALO, April 16, *Italy*, John Clarke Adams

NEW YORK, April 16, College Conference—  
*The Future of Freedom*, Vera M. Dean, Julian Woodward

UTICA, April 16-17, Institute — *The Marshall Plan*, Bjarne Braatoy, Eugene Demont, Edward W. Fox

CLEVELAND, April 17, *The Politics of Peace*, Grayson Kirk, Herman Finer, James Burnham

PHILADELPHIA, April 17, *Strategic Role of the U.S. in the Mediterranean*, Walter Livingston Wright, Jr., C. Grove Haines

## Program Notes

The Cincinnati experiment of the suburban meeting on April 7 was a great success. The panel was made up of former Prime Minister of Greece Panayotis Kanelopoulos and three FPA members—William Hessler, editorial writer on the *Cincinnati Enquirer*, Carl D. Groat, editor of the *Cincinnati Post*, and James J. Cassidy, radio war correspondent of station WLW. A large portion of the program was built on questions from the floor ably answered by the speakers. The local committee was primarily responsible for an audience of 1,100 gathered as a result of telephone invitations, personal visits, and excellent advance newspaper and radio publicity. The grounds of the high school where the meeting was held displayed huge posters, illuminated by red flares. . . .

With warm weather just around the corner some audiences are looking for lighter fare. Many who are not attracted by announcements of discussion meetings do respond to film showings. A documentary film is an effective starting point for group discussion, and it has been demonstrated that those who "come to see, stay to talk." National Headquarters has a list of films suitable for such occasions. Inquiries concerning them should be addressed to the director of the Speakers Bureau, Frances J. Pratt.

Britain hopes to switch to an increasing degree from dollar to nondollar sources for purchase of food from overseas. It is estimated that 46 per cent of its food will be bought from the sterling area in the first half of 1948. Food from hard currency countries (the United States, Canada and Argentina) will drop from 47 per cent of total food imports in 1947 to 29 per cent. . . . Steadily mounting production of tin and rubber will probably raise the value of *Indonesia's exports* from \$125 million in 1947 to \$350 million in 1948. Dutch officials believe that this favorable economic picture will not be upset by further political strife. . . . World oil shortages, and security considerations are leading American producers, with Washington's help, to seek *new sources of oil in the Western Hemisphere*. The Latin American countries, however, insist on imposing conditions that will protect national welfare. Mexico is willing to allow oil companies to come back, but only for wildcat drilling operations. Venezuela is asking American producers to plough back 50 per cent of profits into local development projects.

## Lagniappe

The search for speakers with ideas and information to contribute to FPA platforms goes on continuously. Recently Frances J. Pratt of the Speakers Bureau heard some fifteen speakers at the fifty-second annual meeting of the American Academy of Political and Social Science at Philadelphia.

## Voice of America

The International Broadcasting Division of the State Department has prepared a script for its "Voice of America" program built entirely on the Foreign Policy Association, to be translated into foreign languages for shortwave broadcast overseas, and especially to areas behind the Iron Curtain. The program gives the historical background of the FPA, various details of its 30 years of activity in the educational field, and underlines the importance of having the citizen understand world problems and assume responsibility for the determination of foreign policy.